This paper studies the impact of unilateral divorce laws on child weight gain. indicate that for the speci…c age group of children between 7 and 18 years the exposure to unilateral divorce law leads to bigger BMI and bigger probability to be overweight. I also investigate the possibles transmission mechanisms for the increase in BMI.
Introduction
In the 70's, the USA witnessed a tranformation into the family unity that has been called the "Divorce Revolution". The unilateral divorce-divorce that does not require the explicit consent of both partners-reached 28 The unilateral divorce law (UD) has been perceived as negative for children, once the ease of divorce could lead to the breakdown of the traditional family. Indeed, there is a large literature in sociology, developmental psychology, and economics that documents the negative impact to children of divorced parents, both as children and then later as adults. Amato and Keith (1991), for example, report that children of divorce have more di¢ culty than children in intact families adjusting both socially and psychologically.
Surveys show that children of divorce are more likely to exhibit antisocial and impulsive behavior. They are more likely to become delinquents (Matsueda and Heimer, 1987; Zill, Morrison, and Coiro, 1993), and to perform worse academically (Guidubaldi, Perry, and Cleminshaw, 1984).
In this paper, I investigate whether the UD a¤ects child weight gain. I use di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach using the variation resulting from the di¤erences in the timing of the adoption of UD across the adopting states. To assess the impact of UD on child weight gain, I analyze a comprehensive nationwide health and nutrition examination survey (NHANES I) during [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] . According to the Center of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) there is only one type of underweight (underweight type I) and two types of overweight (overweight and obese). I propose more two less extreme underweight measures (underweight types II and III), to have a more detailed description weight distribution of children . 1 My results show that the introduction of UD leads to lower probability of being underweight type II and higher Body Mass Index (BMI) for children between 2 and 18 years old. Children between 2 and 18 years that have been exposed to UD between 1 and 5 years have lower 0.06 percentage point (p.p.) chance to be underweight type II. When exposed for 6 or more years the probability to be underweight type II is lower by 0.15 p.p. and the probability to be underweight type III is lower by 0.38 p.p.. Moreover, the 1 Overweight is de…ned as a BMI at or above the 85th percentile for their heigh and wheight and below the 95th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex. Obesity is de…ned as a BMI at or above the 95th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex. Underweight type I is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 5th percentile, underweight type II is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 10th percentile, underweight type II is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 25th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex.
BMI increases by 2.36 units when the child is exposed to UD for at least 6 years, which is 14.8% of the baseline BMI. The big picture is that after the introduction of the UD children are increasing their BMI but they still under a normal weight pattern according to the CDC. According to my proposed approach, however, there is evidence that the a¤ected children are getting healthier, once there is lower probability to be underweight type II after the introduction of UD. I then turn to investigate possible transmission mechanisms from UD to BMI. First, there is the direct e¤ect, the e¤ect of UD on divorce. The UD can dissolve the marriage contract and, therefore, can be seen as a change in those marriage contracts already in place at the time of the reform. Second, marriage decisions could also change in response to UD. Selection into marriage could either be positive or negative. Couples of relatively low match quality are now willing to marry, reducing the average match quality of married couples and therefore increasing their marriage and divorce propensity In order to adress the …rst mechanism I examine both the impact on the likelihood that adults in childbearing age are divorced and the impact on other marital status that may be a¤ected by this shift in legal regimes. The results from this exercise indicate that divorce per is acting as a transmission mechanims from UD to child BMI. Even though the probability of being married is not a¤ected by the UD, it is important to note that, my results are capturing the contemporaneous e¤ect of UD. Therefore, I cannot rule out the role of marriage as a transmission mechanism in the long term.
In order to shut down the selection into marriage and relationship-speci…c investments mechanims, I study children between 7 and 18 years. This age group is mostly comprised of children born before the introduction of the UD, with marriage decisions taken before the UD comes into place. Children exposed to UD between 1 and 5 years have 0.08 p.p. lower chance to be underweight type II. Children exposed to UD for 6 or more years have higher BMI by 3.77 units, which is 25.8% of the baseline BMI, lower the probability of being underweight type II by 0.08 p.p. and lower probability of being underweight type III by 0.15 p.p.. However, the probability of being overweight increases by 0.87 p.p. when exposed to 6 or more years to UD. The results can be considered mixed, once on the one hand, it indicates that children have lower chance to be underweight type II. And on the other hand, indicates that those same children have higher chance to be overweight. These …nding indicate that the total e¤ect of selection into marriage and marriage-speci…c investiment is positive (decreases the wheight of children) and greater than the total e¤ect of divorce per se and bargaining (increases the wheight of children).
The literature on the e¤ects of UD on children is not extensive. Gruber (2004) , using a sample of adults (25 to 50 years old) from the US Census data for the period 1960 to 1990, …nds that those who were exposed to the reform as children have lower educational attainments and lower family incomes, marry earlier but separate more often, and have higher odds of adult suicide. Delpiano and Giolito (2008) using Census data for the period 1960 to 1980, link children between ages 6 and 15 with their mothers. They …nd that, because of the reform, mothers are more likely to be below the poverty line, to be divorced and to have lower family income. At the same time, they …nd that children are less likely to attend a private school and, in the case of black children, more likely to be repeating a grade.
I extend the previous literature by analysing the impact of UD on child weight. Few papers (Yannakoulia, et. al., 2008; Kimbro, 2013; Biehl et. al., 2014) show evidence that children are at greater risk of being obese because they are living outside of an intact family. A central limitation of these studies, however, is that divorce is not an exogenous event with respect to other determinants of child outcomes. Moreover, I study the heterogeneity in the impact of the reform among children exploiting the di¤erences in the size of the exposure to UD and di¤erences in age at which the child faced the reform.
With this speci…cation, I am also able to study potential transmission mechanisms from UD to the family and from the family to the child, depending on at which point of the child's life the family has faced the reform.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present literature review. Section 3 presents the history of UD. In Section 4, I discuss my data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 presents a full discussion on the results, interpretation and mechanisms. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
The beginning of the 70'the USA witnessed a rise in divorce rates. Initially, part of the literature (Peters, 1986) proposed that the UD implementacion did not change divorce rates. The argument behind Peters' conclusions is that the introduction of UD simply represents the reallocation of an existing property right from one spouse to the other.
According to the Coase theorem, a change in property rights does not change resource allocation but in ‡uences the distribuition of wealth. Therefore, the transaction costs should not be important for the study of marriage. Latter on, another part of the literature suggested that the ease of divorce was a major contributing factor for the rapidly rise in divorce rates because it represented the breakdown of the traditional family structure (Douglas, 1992; Friedberg,1998) . This …ndings has since been widely accepted until (Wolfers, 2006) . He …nds that the divorce rate rose sharply following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but that this rise was reversed within about a decade. Therefore, he claims that there is no evidence that the rise in divorce is persistent. 2 Divorce has been perceived as negative for children since it represented a rupture of the tradicional family structure. Several studies have tried to identify the impact of easier divorce process on a child outcomes. After reviewing 92 studies, Amato and Keith (1991) reported that children of divorced parents have more di¢ culty then children in intact families adjusting both socially and psychologically. Surveys show that children from divorced families are more likely to exhibit behavior that is antisocial or impulsive.
They are more likely to become delinquents and they are more likely to perform worse academically (Matsueda and Heimer 1987; Zill, Morrison, and Coiro 1993).
The research on adolescents from divorced families also documents negative consequences. Adolescents with divorced parents are two to three times more likely to drop out of school, become pregnant, or engage in antisocial and delinquent behavior, and they score above clinical cuto¤s on standardized tests of behavior (Achenbach and Edelbrock 1983). These adolescents also begin to date and have sex at a younger age (Flewelling and Bauman 1990) . Adolescents whose parents have divorced are more likely to have a low academic performance and to drop out of school, even after one controls for socioeconomic status (Guidubaldi et. al. 1984; Krein and Beller 1988) .
A central limitation of these studies is that divorce not necessarily is an exogenous event with respect to other determinants of child outcomes. The exception are Gruber (2004) and Delpiano and Giolito (2008). Gruber points out that adults who were exposed to UD regulations as children are less well educated, have lower family incomes, marry earlier but separate more often and have higher odds of adult suicide. Delpiano and Giolito (2008) found that the unilateral divorce reform have negative e¤ects on child 2 Wolfers (2006) explores several possible explanations. First, he explres dynamics, i.e, UD may have simply led to the earlier dissolution of bad matches, thereby shifting a number of divorces from the 1980s into the 1970s. Second, there is matching. The quantity and quality of marriage market matches may change in response to divorce law changes. Moreover, there is contamination. An easier access to divorce in reform states may also reduce stigma in non-reform states, leading their divorce rates to rise, albeit with a lag. Finally, ther is the the regression to the mean. States with historically higher divorce rates were more likely to choose to reform their laws. Therefore, this suggests that convergence in divorce norms, or regression to the mean, may explain why divorce rates rose faster in control states, yielding negative coe¢ cients. outcomes, measured by the likelihood of children aged 0-4 being held back in school.
A few papers have di¤erent approachs and found di¤erent results. Piketty (2003) suggests that parental con ‡icts, rather then separation per se, is bad for children by looking at the school performance of children a couple of years before their parents separate. Piketty found that these children are doing as bad as children already living with only one of their parents. Bjorklund and Sundstron (2006) adopted a sibling-di¤erence approach, in order to take di¤erences in family background more e¢ ciently into account.
They found no impact of parental separation. Thus, an older sibling who lived with both parents during his/her childhood did not have an educational advantage over a younger sibling who experienced a separation in childhood.
The previous literature in economics scrutinized several child outcomes due to parental divorce, but not child weight gain. However, some papers from di¤erent research …elds have investigated the weight gain e¤ects of divorce on children by measuring the association of the two, without the assessment of causality. Their data indicate that family-related factors, namely divorce, parental BMI, number of siblings, and daily screen time, signi…cantly predicted child's BMI at the age of 9-11 years. Kimbro (2013) assessed whether U.S children are at greater risk of being obese because they are living outside of an intact family. The result from his article indicate that children in non-tradicional families had higher odds of obesity compared to children in married-parent households. Biehl et al. (2014) found that general and abdominal obesities were more prevalent among children of divorced parents in Norway.
History of Unilateral Divorce Law
Fault divorce was the traditional state regulation in the United States which allowed for divorce only for such grounds as in…delity and physical abuse. The necessary condition to have a divorce was to have a partner at fault. Furthermore, the fault divorce had to be mutually agreed upon by both partners. Marriages that were viewed as "broken"by the couple could not be dissolved without more complex justi…cation. This law was widely viewed as socially inadequate, which led to a movement for reform of U.S. divorce laws.
The …rst step in these reforms was moving to no-fault divorce, which was in place before 1950 in a number of states. The no-fault divorce, while maintaining the mutual consent feature, allowed the divorce even if neither party was at fault.
The UD, which allowed divorce with the consent of just one rather then both spouses, was possibly the biggest change to divorce law in the United States in its history. The UD was rare before the late 60s, but it was in place in most states by the mid-1970s. The primary variable of interest is the child's BMI. BMI is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (kg=m 2 ). 3 The BMI is o¢ cially calculated beginning from age of 2 years old. According to CDC there are four types of weight categories: underweight type I, normal weight, overweight and obese. The CDC has produced a chart of percentiles describing the BMI distribution by age (in months) and sex of children based on early waves (from the 1960s, 70s, and 80s) of the nationally representative NHANES. Overweight is de…ned as a BMI at or above the 85th percentile and below the 95th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex. Obesity is de…ned as a BMI at or above the 95th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex. Underweight type I is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 5th percentile. In order to estimate the consequences of the UD on child weight gain I also consider two more types of underweight (types II and III) because the CDC has two thresholds for children above the normal weight and one threshold for children under the normal weight. The threshold (10th and 25th percentiles) that de…ne the level of underweight were chosen because they were the only avaliables from CDC charts. Underweight type II is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 10th percentile, underweight type III is de…ned as a BMI at or below the 25th percentile for children and teens of the same age and sex. I consider these two more types of underweight to have a more detail description of the children Half of the child sample is composed of boys and 84% are white. The average exposure to UD from adult sample in childbearing age is 20.8%. The fraction of divorced, married and separated in the adult sample is 0.04%, 82.9% and 0.02% respectively. i;j;t equals to 1 if the person i in state j and time t was exposed to UD from 1 to 5 years; and equals to 0 otherwise. The variable Exp 6 or more i;j;t equals to 1 if the person had equal or more then 6 years of exposure to UD; and equals to 0 otherwise. 4 j is a set of state …xed e¤ects which absorbs time-invariant di¤erences in observable and unobservable characteristics. t is a set of year …xed e¤ects that accounts for potential common time e¤ects across states. X i;j;t is a set of control variables such as race and age of children. The standard error are made to adjust for the survey sample scheme. The variable " i;j;t is the error term. 5 The results from Eq. (1) are presented in Table 3 . Column (1) reports the result for a simple OLS regression for child BMI. Column (2) includes state …xed e¤ects and Column (3) includes year …xed e¤ects. Column (4) includes a set of race dummies and Column (5), which is my preferred speci…cation, also includes a set of age dummies. The results show that children exposed to UD for 6 or more years have a higher BMI of 2.36 units, which is 14.8% of baseline. BMI is not a¤ected by exposure to UD between 1 and 5 years.
The results from Column (5) indicate an increase of the child's BMI due to the introduction of the divorce regime. It is important to highlight the fact that, higher BMI not necessarily indicates an unhealthy outcome. According to the CDC, a BMI is considered normal if it is between 5th and 85th percentile for their age and sex group. Therefore, a child can increase his BMI and still be under normal weight.
In order to evaluate if the impact of UD is actually making chidren worse, i.e, unhealthy, I run Eq. (1) with …ve types of dummy dependent variables: being obese, overweight and underweight types I, II and III. Column (6) and (7) present the results for the probability of being obese and overweight. Neither weight indicator is signi…cantly a¤ected by the introduction of the UD regime. Column (8) show that the the probability of being underweight type I is not a¤ected by UD. Column (9) shows that the probability of being underweight type II descreases by 0.06 p.p. when exposed between 1 and 5 years and descreases by 0.15 p.p. when exposed to 6 or more years. Column (10) shows that the probability of being underweight type III descreases by 0.38 p.p. when exposed to 6 or more years.
The central interpretive issue with these results is the mechanisms through which UD regulation leads to outcomes. There are four possibilities, non mutually exclusive. The …rst candidate is parental divorce per se. The easing of divorce laws made it easier for people to leave bad marriages. A child that is exposed to their parents …ght could improve, in terms of well-being, when they divorce. Alternatively, having divorced parents may be worse in terms of welfare for the child because of coordination, for example. Divorce per se, theferore, can either have a positive nor negative impact on a child's life.
Second, UD may change the selection into marriage, which could be either positive or negative. Selection into marriage may lead to a negative selection into marriage. That i;j;t 3 + t + j + " i;j;t (2) where in addition to the other indices Divorce i;j;t is a variable equals to 1 when the person i in state j and time t is divorced (or some other marital status indicator) and equals to 0 otherwise.
The results are presented in Table 4 from Eq.(2). Column (1) reports the result for the impact of UD on the probability of being divorced including a set of individual's age and race dummies, state …xed e¤ects and year …xed e¤ects. When exposed to 6 or more years to UD the probability of being divorced increases 0.10 p.p.. There is evidence, therefore, that making divorce easier increases the chance that children are more likely to be living in nontraditional families. Exposure between 1 and 5 years to UD is not signi…cant. Column (2) and (3) report the results for the probability of being married and separated. Netheir probability seems to be signi…cantly a¤ected by the introduction of UD.
The results from Eq.(2) indicate that the divorce per is acting as a transmission mechanims from UD to child BMI. Even though the probability of being married is not a¤ected by the UD, it is important to note that, Eq. (2) is capturing the contemporaneous e¤ect of UD. Therefore, I cannot rule out the role of marriage as a transmission mechanism in the long term.
As mentioned before, the present work investigates the impact of an easier divorce process on several marital status indicators. It is important to highlight that NHANES I is a sample whose goal is to understand the health status of the US, theferore, it is not ideal for this exercise. Additionally, I belive the previous work have better data and have done a …ne job uncovering the impact of UD on marital status indicators, which is postive and in line with Gruber (2004) and Wolfers (2006).
Children between 7 and 18 years
One concern with the approach described in Section 5.1.1 is that there are several transmission mechanisms from UD to child outcome. As said before, a child can be a¤ected by several channels. In order to minimize the e¤ect of some of those mechanisms, I estimate Eq.(1) for children between 7 to 18 years old. But, it is important to note that it is not appropriate to extrapolate the results for children in general, once this approach also introduces age speci…c e¤ects problem. It could be the case that the impact of UD is not homogeneous across ages.
In this speci…c age group 99% of than where born before the UD regime. Therefore, I can rule out (or at least decrease at its maximum) the e¤ect of selection bias into marriage, once the parents got married before the UD. It is also possible to rule out changes in the relationship speci…c-investments, since those choices were already made before the child's birth. The remaining mechanisms are divorce per se and changes in the bargaining position.
The results are presented in Table 5 . Column (1) reports the result for children BMI for an OLS regression including a set of individual's age and race dummies, state …xed e¤ects and year …xed e¤ects. Children exposed to UD for 6 or more years have higher BMI by 3.77 units, which is 25.8% of baseline. BMI is not a¤ected by exposure to UD between 1 and 5 years.
I then consider 5 other weight indicators: being obese, overweight and underweight types I, II and II. Column (2) present the result for the probability of being obese, which is not signi…cant. Column (3) presents the results for the probability of being overweight, which increases by 0.87 p.p. when the child is exposed to 6 or more years to UD. Column (4) shows that the probability of being underweight type I is not a¤ected by the UD.
Column (5) shows that the probability of being underweight type II is lower by 0.08 p.p. when the child is exposed between 1 and 5 years to UD and lowers 0.08 p.p. when exposed for at least 6 years. Column (6) reports the result for the probability of being underweight type III. Children exposed to 6 or more years to UD have 0.15 p.p. lesser chance to be underweight type III.
The results found in this Section suggest that the e¤ects of the remaining mechanisms for this age group, divorce per se and changes in the bargaining, are negative (increases BMI) if I compare with the results found in Section 5.1.1. In Section 5.1.1 the results indicate an increase in the BMI and lower probability to be underweight. In this Section the results also show an increase in the BMI and lower probability to be underweight, but now there is also the increase in the probability to be overweight. The conclusion from these results is that the mechanisms divorce per se and changes in the bargaining have a negative e¤ect (increases BMI) on child health.
Children between 2 and 6 years
The introduction of UD can a¤ect a child's health through several transmission mechanisms. It is important to note, however, that depending on the child's age, the channels of transmission from UD to child weight should di¤er.
In Section 5.1.1, the results showed that children between 2 and 18 years old are increasing their BMI and being less likely to be underweight types II and III. However, children between 2 years and 18 years are di¤erent. In Section 5.1.2 I dived the sample in children between 7 and 18 years but I introduce a age speci…c e¤ects problem. In this Section, I use chidren between 2 and 6 years to study if there behavior are very di¤erent from the older ones.
In order to analyze the di¤erent channels I also run another speci…cation for three age groups of younger children: W M i;j;t = 0 + 1 DExp i;j;t + X 0 i;j;t 2 + t + j + " i;j;t (3) where, in addition to the other indices, DExp i;j;t is a dummy for the presence of a unilateral reform law in the year the NHANES interview or in the previuos years. Once the child's age ranges from 2 to 6 years old, it does not make sense to use a dummy variable that indicates the presence of at least 6 years of exposure to UD. Therefore, this speci…cation is slightly di¤erent from the one in Eq.(1).
The results are presented in Table 6 . Columns (1)-(6) report the result for children between 2 and 6. All of the regressions include a set of individual's age and race dummies, state …xed e¤ects and year …xed e¤ects.
The results show that the UD reduces the probability of being underweight type III by 0.13 p.p., therefore, increasing the child's health.
In Section 5.1.2 I estimate Eq.(2) with children between 7 and 18 years old to shut down two possible transmission mechanisms: selection into marriage and marriage-speci…c investiment. Therefore, is straightforward that when I estimate Eq.(3) with children between 2 and 6 years old there is the presence of the four transmission mechanisms.
The results of this Section should be read with careful once there are too many forces acting here: the presence of the age speci…c e¤ects and two additional transmission mechanims (selection into marriage and marriage-speci…c investiment).
Robustness Checks
In this section, I undertake several robustness checks. The …rst potential threat to the results arises from the possibility that estimated e¤ects may re ‡ect a speci…cation bias.
I run several speci…cations to analyse if and how the results change. Table 7 presents the results for Eq.(1) using the whole sample of children, 2 to 18 years, instead of only 2 and 6 years. Column (1) reports the results for child BMI, Column (2) for probability of being obese, Column (3) for probability of being overweight, Column (4) for probability of being underweight type I, Column (5) for probability of being underweight type II and Colum (6) for the probability of being underweight type III. Independently of the weight measure, the variable DExp i;j;t is not signi…cant. The only exception is the probability of being underweight type II. Children expose to UD have lower 0.05 p.p. The results from Columns (1)- (2) show no impact of UD on child BMI. Column (3), however, shows a similar result to the ones found in section 5.1.1. When exposed for at least 5 years to UD the child BMI increases by 2.06 units.
Finally, there is a concern that the results are driven by outlier states. The obvious candidate is California, once its a large state and was one of the …rsts to allow the UD.
The basic pattern of results, however, remains the same, as can be seen in Table 9 .
Validating the Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy employed in this paper exploits time and state variation in the adoption of the UD. The underlying assumption is that the timing of introduction of UD is not correlated with child health, meaning weigh. To test whether this hypothesis is valid I have also pursued a series of speci…cation checks to assess whether I am truly uncovering a causal impact of UD regulations.
One concern is that there are somehow other omitted state variables that are correl- One obvious candidate of omitted variable is education. It is possible that UD were being passed in states where there was less educational levels, once again leading to more adverse child health outcomes. The results in Table 10 show no signi…cant correlation with the presence of UD in the 70's. Another candidate is income. Using the same strategy, as mentioned before, I once again …nd no signi…cant correlation with the presence of UDs.
Another way to check whether my empirical strategy is valid is to add income and education as control variables in the equations. The results do not alter, corroborating that the timing of introduction of UD is not correlated with the omitted variables mentioned before.
Discussion
The In order to try to understand the transmission mecahnims, I study children between 7 to 18 years old. In this speci…c age group the majority where born before UD implementation. The ideia is to rule out selection bias into marriage, once the parents got married befora the UD law. It is also possible to rule out changes in the relationship speci…c-investments, since those choices regarding the relationship investiments were already made before the child's birth. But, it is importante to keep in mid that I also introduce age speci…c e¤ects problem. The remaining mechanisms, therefore, were divorce per se and changes in the bargaining position.
The results indicate that exposure to UD no longer leads to better health for children between 7 and 18 years. Exposed children had higher BMI, bigger probability to be overweight and lower probability to be underweight type II. Following the de…nitions of healthy weight from the CDC, the introduction of UD had an overall negative impact on child health, once underweight type II still is consider normal weigh. It is important to remember that, the result for older chidren can not be generalized, once the majority were born under the no-fault divorce law. The next generation will be born under the UD. The extrapolation exercise should not be done. However, using my indicator of underweight, the results can be considered mixed. On the one hand, there is a lower probability to be underweight type II. On the another hand, there is a bigger probability to be overweight.
When I compare the results for children between 7 and 18 years and children between 2 and 18 years the results suggest that the e¤ects of the remaining mechanisms for the …rst age group, divorce per se and changes in the bargaining, are negative. The results for children between 2 and 18 years indicate an increase in the BMI and lower probability to be underweight. However, the results for children between 7 and 18 years also show an increase in the BMI and lower probability to be underweight, but now there is also the increase in the probability to be overweight. The conclusion from these results is that the mechanisms divorce per se and changes in the bargaining have a negative e¤ect on child health.
Another concern is that, depending on the child's age, the channels of transmission from UD to child weight should also di¤er. On the one hand, there is the direct parental in ‡uence: parents can in ‡uence their children through several ways (Benton, 2004) . First, there is the food as reward. Parents can o¤er of one food (dessert) as a reward for the eating of another (vegetables). Second, there is the limit access to food, where the child is simply not allowed to eat a certain type of food (candies, chocolate, etc). And …nally, there is the parental example, i.e, parents eating healthy food in front of the children. Moreover, there is the child own will as a mechanims. It is plausible to assume that as the child becomes older, he/she also becomes more independent, in terms of feeding. It is straightforward to infer that, external events can play a crucial role determining the type and amount of food the child is eating. Exposure to traumatic events during childhood is associated with an elevated risk of adult obesity (Gunstad et al., 2006; Felitti et al., 2008 ).
Since I cannot separate these two channels, parental in ‡uence vs. child own will, I
analyze three group of young children (2 to 4; 2 to 5 and 2 to 6). The groups are made so the …rst group is comprised of more dependent children than the second group, and second group is comprised of more dependent children than the third group. It is reasonable to assume that, the younger the child, the strongest the parental in ‡uence. Therefore, the results from this exercise can be interpreted as "cleaned" from child own will e¤ects.
Once again, according to CDC there is no evidence that younger kids are changing their weight. However, following my de…nition of underweight, there is a weak evidence that younger kids are getting healthier, meaning smaller probabilty to be underweight type III. It is importante to note that, when I estimate with children between 2 and 6 years old there is the presence of the four mechanisms. The results for this age group should be read with careful once there are too many forces acting here: the presence of the age speci…c e¤ects and two more transmission mechanims (selection into marriage and marriage-speci…c investiment) when compared to children between 7 and 18 years.
I undertake several robustness checks. The …rst potential threat to the results arises from the possibility that estimated e¤ects may re ‡ect a speci…cation bias. I …rst tryed to capture the impact of the UD through a unique dummy variable (any exposure to UD).
The results showed that independently of the weight measure the impact of UD was not signi…cant. This result is not surprising since an unique dummy variable assumes that the impact of UD is the same for all the a¤ected sample. The speci…cation that uses only one dummy variable probably do not represents what actually happens, once one would expect that di¤erent lenghts of exposure should have di¤erent impacts on child health.
Its reasonable to assume that one year of exposure to UD should have a di¤erent impact of 10 years of exposure. Moreover, California is a obvious to be an outlier state. Once its a large state and was one of the …rsts states to allow the UD. The basic pattern of results, however, remains the same.
Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether the UD a¤ects child health through weight gain. I use di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach using the variation resulting from the di¤erences show that the introduction of UD leads to unhealthy weight gain. Children are putting on more weight, however they still under the normality patterns established by the CDC.
I also verify if the UD a¤ects the marital status. The impact of UD is positive on the probability of being divorced when the person is in childbearing age. The probability of being married and separated is not a¤ected.
The UD can dissolve the marriage contract and, therefore, the unilateral reform can be seen as a change in those marriage contracts already in place at the time of the reform.
Therefore, the change in legislation should produce di¤erent e¤ects over those individuals who had taken marriage or investment decisions based on mutual consent divorce rules.
Even though those e¤ects are transitional overall, they may become permanent for children of those families caught in the transition. In order to analyse the behavior of couples who had taken marriage or investment decisions based on mutual consent divorce rules, I consider children between 7 and 18 years. This age group is mostly compoused of children born before the introduction of the UD. The results, following the de…nition of BMI established by the CDC, indicate that children that were born before the introduction of the UD are becoming less healthier.
Moreover, it is important to note that, depending of the child's age, the channels of transmission from UD to child weight should di¤er. Older children may have more food independence, meaning that they can choose more freely the type and amount of food they want to eat. The opposite should occur to younger children, once they are not completely independent. Younger children should be largely in ‡uenced by their parents choices. Therefore, changes in the weight of youger children can be attributed mostly to parents in ‡uence. The results, also following the CDC de…nitions, indicate that younger children are not changing their weight after the UD.
This is the …rst paper in the literature, to the best of my knowledge, to examine the impact of UD on child health, meaning child weight. Further research is necessary to understand and perhaps estimate the transmission mechanism from divorce laws through child outcome. The s a mpl e us ed i s the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s a mpl e i s res tri cted to chi l dren between 2-18 yea rs ol d. Col umns (1)- (5) di s pl ay the es ti ma tes of the i mpa ct of 1-5 yea rs expos ure to UD a nd 6 or more yea rs of expos ure to UD on chil d BMI. Col umn (1) i ncl udes onl y the cons ta nt va ri a ble. Col umn (2) i ncl udes state fixed effects. Column (3) includes years fixed effects. Column (4) includes race dummies and Column (5), which is my baseline regression, includes age dummi es . Col umn (6) di s pla ys es ti ma tes of the i mpa ct of 1-5 yea rs expos ure to UD a nd 6 or more yea rs of expos ure to the proba bi l i ty of bei ng obes e. Col umn (7) di s pl a ys es ti ma tes of the i mpa ct of 1-5 yea rs expos ure to UD a nd 6 or more yea rs of expos ure to the proba bi l i ty of bei ng overwei ght. Col umns (8)-(10) di s pl a y es ti ma tes of the i mpa ct of 1-5 yea rs expos ure to UD a nd 6 or more yea rs of expos ure to the proba bi l i ty of bei ng underwei ght type I, type II a nd type III. Col umns (6)-(10) i ncl udes s ta te fi xed effects , yea r fi xed effects , ra ce a nd a ge dummi es . Sta nda rd errors i n pa renthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BMI
The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child Weight (2 -18 years) The s ample us ed is the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s a mpl e is res tricted to chi ldren between 7-18 yea rs old. Col umns (1)-(6) di s play the es ti ma tes of the impact of 1-5 years expos ure to UD and 6 or more years of expos ure to UD on chil d BMI. Al l regres s i ons incl ude s ta te fi xed effects , year fi xed effects , ra ce and age dummies . The variable BMI refers to child BMI. The variable Obes e is the probability of being obes e. The variable Over refers to the probability of being overwheight. The variables Under I, Under II and Under III, refers to the probability of being underwheight types I, I and III. Standard errors in parenthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) (7 -18 years)
The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child Weight Table 6 (1) The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child Weight
The s a mpl e us ed i s the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s a mpl e i s res tri cted to children between 2-18 years old. All regressions include state fixed effects, years effects race and age dummies.Columns (1)-(6) are restricted to children between 2 and 4 years old. Columns (7)- (12) are restricted to children between 2 and 5 years old. Columns (13)- (18) are restricted to children between 2 and 6 years old. The variable BMI refers to child BMI. The variable Obes e is the probability of being obese. The variable Over refers to the probability of being overwheight. The variables Under I, Under II and Under III, refers to the probability of being underwheight types I, I and III. Standard errors in pa renthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 2 and 6 year The s ample us ed i s the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s a mple is res tricted to children between 2-18 years old. All regress ions include state fixed effects , yea rs effects race a nd a ge dummi es . Columns (1)- (6) di s pla y the es ti ma tes of bei ng expos ed to UD on chil d BMI. The varia bl e BMI refers to chil d BMI. The va ria bl e Obes e i s the probabil ity of being obes e. The varia bl e Over refers to the probability of being overwheight. The variables Under I, Under II and Under III, refers to the probability of being underwheight types I, I and III. Standard errors i n pa renthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child Weight (2-18 years) The s a mpl e us ed i s the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s ample i s res tricted to children between 2-18 years old. All regres sions include s tate fixed effects , years effects race and age dummies . Col umn (1) dis pla ys the effects of expos ure between 1-2 years a nd 3 or more years to UD on chi ld BMI. Column (2) dis plays the effects of exposure between 1-3 years and 4 or more yea rs to UD on chil d BMI. Col umn (3) di s pl ays the effects of exposure between 1-4 years and 5 or more years to UD on child BMI. The constant variable is 15.96 for all s pecifications. Standard errors in pa renthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child BMI (2-18 years) The s a mpl e us ed is the NHANES I from 1971-1974. The s a mpl e is res tri cted to chi l dren between 2-18 yea rs ol d and exclude California state. All regressions include state fixed effects, years effects race and age dummies.
Columns (1)- (6) di s pla y the es tima tes of the i mpa ct of 1-5 yea rs expos ure to UD and 6 or more years of expos ure to UD on chil d BMI (wi thout Ca l iforni a Sta te). The depende va ri a bl e in Column (1) i s chi l d BMI. The depende va ri a bl e in Column (2) i s proba bi l ity of bei ng obes e. The depende va ria ble i n Col umn (3) i s the probabi li ty of being overwheight. The depende va ri a bl es in Columns (4)- (6) i s the proba bi l ity of bei ng underwheight types I,I a nd III. Sta nda rd errors i n pa renthes es (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) (2-18 years)
The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Child Weight (without California) 
